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GARN-ST GERMAIN: A HARBINGER OF CHANGE
STANLEY M. GORINSON*
GLENN B. MANISHIN**
On October 15, 1982, President Reagan signed into law the Garn-St
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 ("Garn-St Germain" or the
"Act").' Although not as transcendent an achievement as claimed by its
champions, Garn-St Germain is nonetheless a most significant piece of
legislation. Included within the Act's myriad provisions, which comprise
some 8 separate titles2 and some 165 different statutory sections, are
measures relating to thrift institutions, commercial banks, bank and sav-
ings and loan (S&L) holding companies, and both federal regulatory agen-
cies and deposit insurance corporations. Indeed, one provision of the Act,
directing the expeditious establishment of an account for depository in-
stitutions "directly equivalent to and competitive with money market
mutual funds,"' has proved both an immediate boon to consumers and a
source of significant short-run cash flow to hard-pressed thrift institutions.
When the excitement generated by these money market deposit ac-
counts and "Super NOW" accounts subsides, however, it will become ap-
parent that Garn- St Germain is but one small step in the transition rapidly
The views contained in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent the views of the United States Department of Justice.
* Chief, Special Regulated Industries Section, Antitrust Division, United States Depart-
ment of Justice; J.D. Rutgers University, 1973; B.A. Brooklyn College, 1967.
** Attorney, Special Regulated Industries Section, Antitrust Division, United States
Department of Justice; J.D. Columbia University, 1981; B.A. Brandeis University, 1977.
Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982). Upon signing the Act, President Reagan
described the legislation as "the most important legislation for financial institutions in the
last 50 years." Remarks on Signing H.R. 6267 Into Law, 18 Weekly Camp. Pres. Doc. 1319
(Oct. 15, 1982).
2 See Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982). The eight legislative titles include five
separate "Acts" within the Garn-St Germain Act itself. See title I, Deposit Insurance Flex-
ibility Act, id. §§ 10141; title II, Net Worth Certificate Act, id. §5 201-06; title III, Thrift
Institution Restructuring Act, id. §§ 301-55; § 410, Banking Affiliates Act of 1982, id. S
410; title VIII, Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, id. SS 801-07.
1 Id. 5 327 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 5 3503(c)(1)). See infra notes 71-75 and accom-
panying text.
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taking place in the financial sector of the country. The swift and momen-
tous changes now wracking the industry, from increased competition
between banks and securities and investment banking firms to the
burgeoning development of electronic funds transfer technology, are blur-
ring traditional legal, regulatory, and economic distinctions among the
various segments of the industry and laying the groundwork for future
change. Garn-St Germain, in short, is neither all the regulatory reform
that is needed nor all the reform that is desirable in the financial services
industry.
As originally introduced by Senator Garn,4 the Act would have
modified significantly the regulatory framework first established during
the Great Depression. The Garn bill, for example, would have liberalized
the permissible securities activities of commercial banks under the Glass-
Steagall Act.' A more pressing and politically volatile crisis in the thrift
industry, however, moved Congress to act swiftly on a far narrower range
of issues. This crisis of net worth and liquidity in the thrift industry, the
industry charged traditionally with the task of providing mortgage capital
for residential housing, was the true motivating force behind the Act. The
explosive rise in market interest rates during 1980 and 1981 had made
thrifts the Achilles' heel of the financial services industry. Regulation in-
itially designed to protect thrifts and ensure their "safety and soundness"
threatened instead to strangle thrifts by preventing these institutions from
adapting to fundamental economic and technological changes. Ironically, just
as in the 1930s, when the basic regulatory framework was first established,
Congress in 1982 also acted out of a perception of crisis. In 1982, however,
regulation was more the cause of, rather than the solution to, a near
collapse.
By permitting market interest rate accounts and granting more ex-
pansive asset powers to thrift institutions, Garn-St Germain somewhat
stemmed the immediate crisis and "bought" time during which the thrift
industry began restructuring itself. Nonetheless, the significance of the
Act is broader than a simple bail-out of the industry. Garn-St Germain
follows closely upon the heels of similar and also widely heralded
regulatory reform in the trucking,' airline,7 and railroad8 industries. In-
deed, regulatory reform of financial services began with the Depository
S. 1720, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (Financial Institutions Restructuring and Ser-
vices Act of 1982).
1 Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified at 12 U.S.C. SS 24, 78, 377-78
(1976)). See infra note 116 (discussion of liberalizations proposed by initial Garn bill and
other bills introduced during 97th Congress).
' Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (1980).
' Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
8 Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.,96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980); Railroad Revitaliza-
tion and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31 (1976).
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Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. This strongly
suggests that we are now belatedly witnessing a fundamental shift that
transcends administrations, in the American approach to industrial regula-
tion. Regulation cannot manage markets or control underlying economic
and technological change. Although regulation has an important role in
appropriate circumstances, the primary "regulator" responsible for the
efficient allocation of resources and risk, is the competitive dynamic of
the marketplace. Regulatory reform in this sense is not more than an af-
firmation of the same values embodied in the federal antitrust laws."0
The substitution of competition for regulation, however, creates new
risks as well as new opportunities. While Garn-St Germain avoids the spec-
tre of massive defaults among thrift institutions by removing the yoke
of restrictive regulation, the Act also creates new challenges and hazards
for both thrift institutions and commercial banks. Whether depository in-
stitutions can weather these hazards successfully well may depend upon
how quickly Congress recognizes that the economic and technological
changes that will continue, and likely accelerate, in the next few years
necessitate more fundamental regulatory reform of financial services.
This article explores the dual status of the Garn-St Germain Act as
a reaction to past change and a harbinger of future change. Section I of
this article reviews the regulatory structure, still largely intact, that has
governed the financial services industry since the 1930s. Section I also
examines the distortions engendered by the regulatory framework, distor-
tions that, when coupled with unprecedented trends in the financial
markets, precipitated the thrift industry crisis of the early 1980s. Section
II reviews the Garn-St Germain Act and analyzes the Act's likely impact
on thrift institutions and on competition within and among the various
segments of the financial services industry. Section III discusses two
specific areas of regulatory reform not addressed by the Act, the restric-
tions on interstate bank expansion and barriers to cross-industry com-
petition, and concludes with a more general analysis of some of the legal
and regulatory problems likely to arise in the wake of the Act.
I. THE THRIFT INDUSTRY CRISIS
During 1981, thrift institutions found themselves in the depths of a
significant financial crisis. The thrift industry experienced record operating
' Pub. L. No. 96-211, 94 Stat. 132 (1980). Among other things, the Depository Institu-
tions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 directed a phase-out of all regulatory
ceilings on depository institution interest rates by 1986. See infra text accompanying notes
45-46.
10 See, e.g., 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 401, at 267-68 (1978) ("The cen-
tral thrust of the antitrust laws is preserving competition in those markets where com-
petitive policy has not been displaced by direct governmental regulation or exemption..
. . But it is reasonably clear that an important, if not the principal, underpinning of anti-
trust is that competition makes a substantial contribution to economic performance... "').
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losses, a net deposit outflow of twenty-five billion dollars, and the lowest
level of mortgage lending since 1974.11 With interest rates hovering near
twenty percent, the retained earnings and net worth of thrift institutions
declined for the first time since 1940, the housing market faced its worst
recession since World War II.12 A significant number of thrifts avoided
default only through mergers with financially stronger institutions.'3
Legislation introduced in the House and reported by the House Banking
Committee called for federal loan guarantees totalling at least eight and
one-half billion dollars."
In context of this crisis,'5 the relatively comprehensive deregulation
initially proposed by Senate Banking Committee Chairman Garn was
tabled in favor of a more targeted effort to stablize the thrift industry.
However, the necessity for such crisis reform stemmed largely from the
New Deal regulatory structure Congress had established to rescue the
industry after the collapse of the Great Depression. To understand the
crisis spurring passage of the Garn-St Germain Act, therefore, it is
necessary to understand how regulation, coupled with adverse economic
conditions, spawned that financial crisis.
A. The Regulatory Framework
The regulatory structure governing the financial services industry
is exceedingly complex, involving a mixture of federal legislative restric-
tions, regulatory agency rules, and state legal and regulatory policies. This
section necessarily presents only an overview of the patchwork of
measures that long has protected each segment of the industry from com-
petition with other segments and sister institutions.
Depository institutions", have been subject to regulatory constraints
and protection primarily in the areas of pricing, products and services,
and expansion into new geographic markets. These three general forms
" See 1981 FED. HOME LOAN BANK BD. ANN. REP., 15 FED. HOME LOAN BANK BD. J. 21-32
(1982).
12 Id.
3 See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
" H.R. 6267, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1982 (Net Worth Guarantee Act).
"s See, e.g., Quirk, The Baleful Bailout Bandwagon, FORTUNE, June 14, 1982, at 140-47;
How a Crisis is Speeding Deregulation, Bus. WK., May 31, 1982, at 68.
6 Depository institutions are those financial organizations that accept "deposit"
accounts, including savings, time, and transaction (checking or demand) accounts. Generally,
depository institutions include S&Ls, commercial banks, mutual and stock savings banks,
and credit unions. For purposes of this article, the differences among various types of
depository insitutions, except differences between commercial banks and thrift institutions,
are somewhat less important than the differences between depository institutions and non-
depository financial institutions, such as securities firms like Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner
& Smith, Inc. Even many of these differences are often more of legal than of practical
significance. For example, Merrill Lynch's "Cash Management Account" combines many
of the attributes of traditional demand and savings deposit accounts, but is not legally a




of regulation have been applied somewhat differently to commercial banks
and thrift institutions, the two basic types of depository institutions.17 In
addition, regulation of depository institutions varies depending on whether
an institution is state or federally chartered, and on whether a state
chartered institution is a member of the Federal Reserve System (member
bank) or is insured by either of the federal depository insurance
corporations."8
Although its boundaries have not remained airtight, regulatory
framework has significantly limited competition within the financial ser-
vices industry by designating specific roles for the various types of
financial institutions. Commercial banks traditionally have been granted
the exclusive right to offer demand deposit services and to make com-
mercial loans. Thrift institutions have been permitted to offer savings
accounts and make residential home mortgage loans. Brokerage houses
and investment banking firms, in turn, have been precluded from engag-
ing in the business of commercial banking while permitted to underwrite
and distribute debt and equity securities.19 These distinctions have been
" See, e.g., infra notes 31-38 and accompanying text (discussing differences in deposit
rate ceilings applicable to commercial banks and thrift institutions).
"8 The two federal depository insurance corporations are the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). The
Federal Reserve Board regulates bank holding companies as well as state banks that are
members of the federal reserve system. "National" banks, or federally-chartered commer-
cial banks, are regulated by the Comptroller of the Currency and insured by the FDIC.
State-chartered savings banks, both stock and mutually owned, are regulated and insured
by the FDIC. Federally-chartered S&Ls are regulated by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (FHLBB) and insured by the FSLIC, as are state-chartered S&Ls that are members
of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board System. However, state-chartered S&Ls that are
not members of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board system are nonetheless regulated by
the Bank Board if insured by the FSLIC. As of year end 1980, only 611 state-chartered
S&Ls, representing 1.8% of total S&L assets and located in Maryland, Massachusetts, North
Carolina and Ohio, were not FSLIC-insured. FED. HOME LOAN BANK BD., Savings and Loan
Activity in July, Table 5 (August 28, 1981).
19 The division between commercial and investment banking stems from the Glass-
Steagall Act, which generally prohibits commercial banks from engaging in the investment
banking business, i.e., underwriting and distributing corporate securities. See 12 U.S.C. S
24 (1976}(Glass-Steagall Act). While the Glass-Steagall Act is a statutory barrier against
competition between commercial and investment banks, competition between commercial
banks and thrift institutions has been restricted by the regulatory policy of the Federal
Reserve Board. With some limited exceptions, the Federal Reserve Board consistently has
ruled that bank holding companies may not acquire thrift institutions. See, e.g., Interstate
Fin. Corp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 316 (1982)(permitting acquisition of failing thrift by bank holding
company); First Financial Group, 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 594 (1980); D.H. Baldwin & Co., 63 Fed.
Res. Bull. 270 (1977). The Board's rationale has been that thrifts are not a "proper incident"
to banking within the meaning of section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,
12 U.S.C. § 1843 (c)(8) (1976). Section 4(c)(8) provides that bank holding company affiliates
only may engage in those activities that are "so closely related to banking or managing
or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto." Quite obviously, this provision
of the Bank Holding Company Act, and the Federal Reserve Board's implementation of
Regulation Y, also restrict competition between bank holding companies and non-financial
institutions. See 12 C.F.R. S 225.4 (1983)(Regulation Y).
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complemented by other regulatory preferences. For example, the role of
thrift institutions as primary providers of residential housing capital has
been reinforced by the Internal Revenue Code, which provides favorable
tax treatment to thrift institutions with assets consisting predominantly
of residential property loans. 0
Even more significant are the restrictions on interstate expansion,
through branching or acquisition, by depository institutions. The
McFadden Act2' generally prohibits interstate branching by federally
chartered commercial banks. Similarly, the Douglas Amendment to the
Bank Holding Company Act 2 prohibits bank holding companies from ac-
quiring banks located outside of the state in which the holding company
has its principal place of business, unless permitted by state law. Until
recently,' no state permitted the establishment of banks owned by out-
of-state holding companies. Thrift institutions which are not "banks,"'24
are not subject to the McFadden Act. Geographic expansion by thrifts,
however, was circumscribed by Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB)
regulations that, for many years,' generally limited S&L expansion to
within 100 miles of an institution's home office. 6 Moreover, section 408
of the National Housing Act prohibits interstate expansion by S&L holding
companies. Depository institutions have been most creative in devising
indirect methods of avoiding these restrictions on interstate expansion,
from loan production offices and Edge Act corporations to interstate non-
' I.R.C. S 7701(a)(19)(1976). See infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
21 Banking Act of 1927, ch. 191, S 7, 44 Stat. 1224, amended by National Banking Act
of 1933, ch. 89, § 23, 40 Stat. 189, 12 U.S.C. SS 36, 81 (1976). The McFadden Act's incorpora-
tion of state law means "that a 'branch' may be established only when, where, and how
state law would authorize a state bank to establish and operate a branch." First Nat'l Bank
v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 130 (1969; see 12 U.S.C. 36(c)(1),(2(1976)(McFadden Act). Although
a reasonable construction of the Act is that a national bank may branch on an interstate
basis if a similarly situated state bank could, the McFadden Act has not been construed
expansively by the courts. See Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (automated teller machines are "branches" subject to the McFadden Act).
I Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, S 3(d), 12 U.S.C. S 1842(d) (1976).
3 Some states, most notably New York, have established "reciprocal banking" statutes,
permitting the establishment of bank subsidiaries by out-of-state holding companies if the
holding company's state also permits out-of-state entry. See infra note 136. However, most
states continue to prohibit entry by out-of-state commercial bank holding companies.
24 The Bank Holding Company Act defines "banks" as those institutions accepting
demand deposits and making commercial loans. See 12 U.S.C. S 1841(c) (1976). As discussed
below, the liberalized investment powers granted thrift institutions by the Garn-St Ger-
main Act necessitated an amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act declaring that,
notwithstanding this two-pronged definition, thrift institutions are not "banks." See infra
text accompanying notes 156-58.
In 1981 the FHLBB began to permit S&Ls to branch on a statewide basis, but
cautioned that the FHLBB "generally will approve the establishment of a branch only in
the state in which the home office is located." 12 C.F.R. § 556.5(a)(2), (3)(i)(1983).
See 12 C.F.R. § 556.5(b)(3) (1979) (repealed).
12 U.S.C. S 1730a(e)(3) (1976) (prohibition of interstate acquisitions by unitary and
multiple S&L holding companies).
[Vol. 40:1313
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banking subsidiaries and "nonbank banks."28 Nonetheless, geographic
limitations continue to restrict effective regional competition between
depository institutions,' particularly in retail banking and the provision
of commercial banking services to customers who are limited in their bank-
ing alternatives2 °
The last type of regulation, and the most important in terms of the
origins of the Garn-St Germain Act, is regulation of interest rates. Pricing
regulation was designed to hold the cost of funds to depository institutions"'
below the market rate of interest. Beginning in 1933, the Federal Reserve
Board's Regulation Q set the maximum rates that commercial banks were
permitted to pay on time and savings deposits.2 Gradually, however, ris-
ing market interest rates raised concerns about the ability of thrift in-
stitutions to remain the principal source of residential mortgage capital
while paying increasing interest on deposits. In 1966 a fundamental change
in policy occurred. Congress extended deposit interest rate ceilings to
thrift institutions and established a differential, permitting thrifts to pay
slightly higher rates on deposits than the rates paid by commercial banks.'
Despite periodic increases, the deposit interest ceilings generally have
remained below market rates of interest.'
The major effect of the deposit interest ceilings was to reduce
depository institutions' cost of funds. 5 In connection with the general bar
against commercial lending by thrift institutions, Regulation Q reinforced
2 See generally Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Interstate Banking: Taking Inven-
tory, Economic Review 4-10 (May 1983).
2 See United States v. Citizen & Southern Bank, 422 U.S. 86,118-19 & n.30 (1975). ("Anti-
branching laws.., are now widely recognized as a simple device to protect outlying unit
banks from the rigor of regional competition").
I See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (discussing scope
of geographic competition in commercial banking). Retail banking is the provision of finan-
cial services, such as savings and time deposits and transaction accounts, to individual,
as opposed to business customers.
"1 The cost of funds to depository institutions is the interest rate paid to depositors.
Since deposits are accounted for as liabilities, the cost of funds is sometimes referred to
in this article as the "cost of liabilities."
I The payment of interest on commercial bank demand deposits traditionally has been
prohibited. The Act reinforces this by specifying that although thrift institutions are per-
mitted to offer demand accounts, they "may not pay interest on a demand account." Garn-
St Germain Act, title III, § 312 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)(1)(B)).
" Pub. L. No. 89-597 (1966) (codified at 12 U.S.C. S 371(b), 1425(b)(a), 1828(g), and
accompanying regulations).
- See Carron, The Plight of the Thrift Institutions 5, Figure 1-1 (1981). Coupled with
the fact that the interest deposit ceilings have provided a "focal point" for price competi-
tion, the gap between the interior- ceilings and market rates of interest generally resulted
in institutions paying the highest interest rate permitted on any given class of deposits.
See Carron, The Plight of the Thrift Institutions 5, Figure 1-1 (1981).
1 In addition, another significant effect of pricing regulation was to encourage sometimes
excessive non-price competition, such as the establishment of a large number of full-service
branches and the payment of "implicit interest" in the form of "free" gifts and services.
See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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product and services regulation and created a protected niche for thrift
institutions, by allowing the use of short-term liabilities" to finance in-
vestment in long-term assets." The system worked smoothly so long as
the return on assets exceeded the cost of liabilities by a sufficient margin
to cover operating expenses. During the late 1960s and 1970s, the spread
between mortgage interest rates and regulated deposit interest rates pro-
vided thrifts with a "comfortable operating margin." 8
B. The Effects of Regulatory Distortions
Regulation by definition creates distortions in otherwise competitive
markets. Some competitive distortions, like lower productivity associated
with pollution control regulation, are deemed beneficial although they may
reduce economic efficiency. Other competitive distortions are the intended
result of regulation designed to suppress competition and protect a favored
industry from the vagaries of the marketplace. In the long run, however,
regulatory restraints cannot eliminate competition. Technological develop-
ment and marketing ingenuity create new forms of competition that make
the regulatory "protection" increasingly ephemeral. In many instances,
regulatory protectionism ultimately may place the protected industry at
a competitive disadvantage. Only when this simple fact becomes obvious
to policy-makers is regulatory reform a realistic consequence.
These general observations can be illustrated by the impact of pric-
ing regulation on thrift institutions. As market interest rates rose above
the deposit interest ceilings mandated by Regulation Q, price competi-
tion among depository institutions was eliminated. Non-price competition
in personalized services and other forms of implicit interest, such as "free"
gifts for new accounts4" and numerous, fully staffed branches,4 were
' In the rubric of financial institutions, deposit accounts, which represent funds owed,
are "liabilities." "Assets" are loans and other investments for which the financial institu-
tion is the creditor.
I These short-term thrift liabilities were interest regulated savings and time deposits.
Long-term thrift assets were, and still are, predominantly fixed rate residential housing
mortgages.
" Carron, supra note 34, at 11. Both the lower rate ceilings for banks, and the lack
of bank regulatory constraints on assets and tax incentives to compete for mortgage loans,
limited competition between banks and thrifts for savings deposits. Id.
See generally R. NOLL & B. OWEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEREGULATIOM (1983).
40 One of the first actions of the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee,
established by the Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
was to place restrictions on the distribution of "free" gifts by depository institutions. See
12 C.F.R. § 1204.109(a) (1983). Of course, these gifts were never "free" because the depositor
paid the difference between the lost interest resulting from the deposit rate ceilings and
the value of the gift. Moreover, institutions generally required a minimum deposit for a
customer to receive a gift. Thus, the gifts were "free" only in that small depositors were
subsidizing larger depositors. Recently, the DIDC voted to phase out minimum balance re-
quirements for all deposit accounts by January 1, 1986. Panel on Bank and Thrift Accounts
Votes to Phase Out Rules on Minimum Balances, Wall Street J., Oct. 3, 1983, at 6, col. 1.
41 To this extent, deposit interest ceilings may have slowed the advent of electronic
[Vol. 40:1313
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substituted in its place. Moreover, rising interest rates encouraged in-
vestment in alternative financial instruments paying market rates, directly
reduced the aggregate amount of new deposits available to depository
institutions, and restricted their ability to compete with non-depository
financial institutions.
The combination of product restrictions and rate regulation forced
thrifts into a precarious situation. Deposit interest ceilings, fixed under
Regulation Q in the face of rising market interest rates, led to
"disintermediation, '42 or deposit outflow, that became a recurring problem
at peaks of the interest rate cycle. The traditional maturity imbalance
between smaller, short-term liabilities and larger, long-term fixed rate
assets exacerbated the disintermediation and placed increasing pressure
on thrift earnings. Thrifts, in short, were exposed fully to interest rate
risk, lacking the ability to adjust their liabilities or their asset portfolios
to market changes. In response, during the 1970s regulators implemented
a series of stop-gap measures.4" These measures included a revision of
Regulation Q permitting higher interest rates on large denomination
"time," or extended-maturity, deposits, and experimental introduction of
negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts in New England, which
permitted the payment of interest on de facto demand deposits. In addi-
tion, the regulators authorized the introduction of money market cer-
tificates of six-month maturities linked to Treasury bill rates and, in 1979,
implemented the authorization for small savers' certificates, designed to
constrain disintermediation of smaller deposits.
Congress intervened in 1980 as market interest rates continued to
rise. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
of 1980 (1980 Act)4 created the Depository Institutions Deregulation Com-
mittee (DIDC)5 to oversee an orderly phase-out of interest rate ceilings
funds transfer (EFT) technology to the banking and thrift industries. In cases which automa-
tion reduces transaction costs, human tellers represent a form of implicit interest. From
this perspective the distortions caused by regulation create another unintended consequence,
namely the distortion of demand through the acceptance of long-standing forms of implicit
interest as a "right" of customers. See Carron, supra note 34, at 46 (although cost-based
pricing "is inherently more efficient than cross-subsidization, consumer acceptance may be
difficult to achieve"). For example, in early 1983 Citibank instituted a policy of limiting
access to human tellers for small depositors. Intensely negative consumer reaction caused
a rapid reversal of this policy.
2 "Intermediation" is the profit associated with a maturity imbalance, i.e., the 'esult
of charging a higher rate on loans than that paid on deposits. "Disintermediation," roughly
the converse, is the deposit outflow caused by individuals seeking a greater return on funds
in non-depository financial instruments carrying market rates of interest.
43 See Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, The Garn-St Germain Act, Economic Perspec-
tives 5-6 (March-April 1983) [hereinafter cited as Economic Perspectives].
" Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980).
I5 The members of the DIDC are the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Chairman of the Board of Direc-
tors of the FDIC, the Chairman of the FHLBB, and the Chairman of the National Credit
Union Administration Board. The Comptroller of the Currency is a nonvoting member of
the DIDC. Id. § 203(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3502(b)).
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by 1986." The Act also liberalized the asset powers of thrifts by permitting
consumer loans, credit cards, the issuance of corporate debt and expanded
activities for S&L service corporations. The DIDC began to act swiftly.
For example, in January 1981, the DIDC authorized NOW accounts na-
tionwide in implementation of the Act.
"It was clear at the time of passage, however, that the Act was not
a panacea."47 Expanded thrift asset powers could not immediately deal
with the large portfolios of long-term, fixed-rate, low interest bearing mort-
gages which were the thrift's inherent weakness. The best form of
assistance would have been a sustained drop in market interest rates,
giving breathing room in which thrifts could exercise their new asset
powers and, over the long-run, reduce the average maturity and raise the
average rate-of-return of their asset portfolios.48 Unfortunately, the credit
markets never provided this assistance.
Throughout 1980 and most of 1981, market interest rates rose to un-
precedented levels, at times over twenty percent. The result was a
precipitous decline in the market value of thrift institution assets49 that
threw many institutions into technical insolvency. Money market mutual
funds, in existence but not highly popular throughout much of the 1970s,
induced massive disintermediation as investors flocked to these highly
liquid, no-minimum maturity market rate instruments.1 The disintermedia-
tion created severe liquidity problems for thrift institutions and produced
some of the largest operating losses in history." These operating losses,
in turn, caused a rapid deterioration of net worth as thrift institutions
dipped into reserves to cover operating expenses. 52 Without the ability
to offer price-competitive financial instruments or to adjust their asset
portfolios closer to market rates, the thrift industry was hemorrhaging
equity in an attempt to remain solvent.
" Id. § 204(a), 207(b). Congress expressly found that "limitations on the interest rates
which are payable on deposits and accounts ... impede the ability of depository institutions
to compete for funds, and have not achieved their purpose of providing an even flow of
funds for home mortgage lending." Id. S 202(aX1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3501(a)(1)).
" Economic Perspectives, supra note 43, at 6.
48 Id.
"9 Like bonds, which also bear fixed rates of interest, the market value of fixed-rate
mortgages varies inversely with the market rate of interest.
I Money market mutual funds increased their assets from $60.9 billion in March 1980,
to $203.3 billion in June 1982, an increase of more than 230% in just over two years. S.
REP. No. 97-536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1982) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
" In 1982, for example, seven of the ten largest publicly owned thrift institutions posted
net per share losses, ranging from $0.70 per share (H.F. Ahmanson & Co.} to $4.30 per
share (Imperial Corp. of America). Mulgahy, Stock S&Ls are Travelling a High Road Back,
AMERICAN BANKER, March 2, 1983, at 3, col. 2.
Carron, supra note 34, at 27. Aggregate S&L net worth decreased $7.5 billion, from
$32.2 billion to $24.7 billion, between January 1, 1981 and June 30, 1982. SENATE REPORT,
supra note 50, at 4.
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II. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
The situation faced by Congress in 1981 was thus critical. The 1980
Act had moved in the right direction, but the limited asset powers the
Act provided were insufficient, and the six-year phase-out of Regulation
Q was too long to counteract effectively the sustained increase in market
rates of interest. Between January 1981, and January 1982, 609 S&Ls,
most of which were financially unstable, voluntarily were merged out of
existence, 166 supervisory mergers were arranged by the FSLIC, and 26
commercial banks and 9 mutual savings banks were closed by the FDIC.'
Predictions that thrift institution closings would rival those of the Depres-
sion were not greatly exaggerated. Politically, the collapse of the housing
market, a result of decreased demand for and supply of mortgage capital
in the face of record interest rates, gave Congress even more reason to
move decisively.
Indeed, for all its significance as a regulatory reform measure, the
Garn-St Germain Act had a much more limited focus. Congress never
reached the more basic deregulation proposals of Senator Garn. The basic
thrust of the Act was to preserve the role of thrifts as the primary source
of residential housing capital by granting new flexiblity that would enable
the regulators to ensure the long-run survival of the industry. As the Con-
ference Committee wrote in the preamble to its report, the purpose of
the Act was "to revitalize the housing industry by strengthening the finan-
cial stability of home mortgage lending institutions and ensuring the
availability of home mortgage loans. '"' The means chosen by Congress
to further this objective, however, include some significant reforms of
financial services regulation.
Those reforms are sufficiently wide-ranging that succinct summariza-
tion of the Act is difficult. To take only two examples, the Act included
provisions authorizing the organization of so-called "bankers' banks,"' and
0 SENATE REPORT, supra note 50 at 4. As of March 31, 1983, the number of S&Ls and
mutual savings banks had decreased from 5,147 in 1979 to 4,148 or by nearly 20%. Finally
Off the Critical List, TME, May 23, 1983, at 38.
1 S. REP. No. 97-641, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE
REPORT. This was the preamble to the bill originally introduced in House by Representative
St Germain. H.R. 6267, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). In contrast, Senatory Garn's bill recited
that the bill's purpose was "[t]o enhance the competitiveness of depository institutions,
to expand the range of services provided by such institutions, to protect depositors and
creditors of such institutions, and for other purposes." S. 1720, 97th Con., 1st Sess. (1981).
- Act 5 404(a). Such "bankers' banks," which are to be regulated by the Comptroller
of the Currency, are "owned exclusively . . . by other depository institutions and [are]
organized to engage exclusively in providing services for other depository institutions and
their officers, directors, and employees:' Id. S 404(a)(2). Because the Act permits the joint
ownership of bankers' banks by any number of depository institutions, S 404(a) of the Act
well may enable smaller depository instititions, not affiliated with bank holding companies
or S&L holding companies, to supply for themselves services previously purchased from
a bank, or S&L, service corporation.
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provisions liberalizing the restrictions on insider loans by member banks,'
both of which passed with little discussion and elicited almost no mention
in the legislative history.'s However, for purposes of analysis, the Act con-
veniently may be divided into two categories: those measures relating
to thrift institutions, and those measures relating to commercial banks.
A. Thrift Institutions
Congress approached the thrift industry crisis with an array of
measures that served two mutually reinforcing objectives. Congress in-
tended to provide more flexibility to federal regulatory agencies to deal
with the short-term threat of thrift failures, and to provide more flexi-
bility to thrifts in their day-to-day activities with which to adapt in the
long-term to changed economic realities. Although the Act's expansion
of the lending and investment powers of thrift institutions goes far to
enhance thrifts' long-run competitive position, Congress recognized that
the Act's new liability and asset powers would not overnight ameliorate
the distortions that resulted from years of restrictive regulation. 8 Thus,
Congress added a regulatory mechanism designed to "provide thrifts with
the time needed to work out their problems and to take advantage of
their new powers while giving federal insurance agencies more flexibility
in dealing with troubled institutions.""
1. The Regulatory Mechanism
The regulatory mechanism developed to deal with the immediate thrift
industry crisis is two-fold. First, the Garn-St Germain Act allows the in-
suring agencies to assist troubled institutions with either direct or merger-
related financial assistance and authorizes "emergency" acquisitions of
failing institutions.' Second, the Act institutes a three-year program under
which the insuring agencies may grant capital assistance to troubled in-
stitutions through the purchase of new capital instruments called "net
worth certificates."'
'
' Id. % 421-14. "Member banks" are those commercial banks, whether state or federally
chartered, that belong to the Federal Reserve System.
" See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 50, at 27-29,33,60,63; CONFERENCE REPORT, supra
note 54, at 90.
[T]he thrift industry's narrow asset authority is not the only reason for its present
plight. Throughout most of the 1970's, the general economy, the structure of the
financial industry, and the relatively low interest [sic] paid on savings accounts
have combined in such a way as to encourage many thrifts to expand without
proper regard for long-range operating cost controls .... It is unlikely that this
problem will disappear as interest rates decline .... Thus, a large segment of
the industry will need time not only to restructure their loan portfolios in light
of the new asset powers contained in Title III of this bill but also to streamline
their existing operating procedures.SENATE REPORT, supra note 50, at 9.
59Id.
'o Act title I, SS 101-41, Deposit Insurance Flexibility Act.
e' Id. title II, SS 201-06, Net Worth Certificate Act.
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Title I, which contains largely parallel sections governing the FDIC
(banks), the FSLIC (S&Ls) and the National Credit Union Administration
(credit unions), liberalizes both how and when the insuring agencies can
grant financial assistance to insured institutions. Sections 111 and 122 of
the Act permit assistance to "prevent" the closing of an institution, to
"restore" a closed institution to "normal" operation, or if "severe finan-
cial conditions" exist which significantly threaten the industry's stability. 2.
By eliminating existing provisions requiring that the insuring agencies
first determine that an insured institution is in danger of closing and that
the institution's services are essential to the community, these sections
should allow the more timely provisions of assistance to troubled savings
banks and S&Ls. Sections 111 and 112 also expand the forms of assistance
that may be provided. Added to such traditional forms of assistance, loans,
deposits and purchases of assets, is the authority to purchase the securities
of,' assume the liabilities of, and to make contributions to insured institu-
tions. Finally, sections 111 and 112 permit assistance to be granted to
facilitate the merger, acquisition or consolidation of a failed, failing, or
unstable institution, and allow assistance to be granted to the acquiring
company as well as the insured institution itself.64
Title I also allows the insurance agencies to arrange the "extraordinary
acquisition" of troubled institutions. Primarily intended to "maximize the
resources" of the agencies' funds,"5 Title I permits the FDIC, the FSLIC
and the NCUA to arrange the acquisition of closed or failing institutions"
Id. 6 S 111,112. The statutory language covering the third situation, clearly intended
to cover any "crisis" similar to that faced by the thrift industry in 1981 and 1982, provides
in pertinent part:
[W]hen severe financial conditions exist which threaten the stability of a signifi-
cant number of insured banks or of insured banks possessing significant financial
resources, [assistance may be granted if] such action is taken in order to lessen
the risk to the Corporation posed by such insured bank under such threat of
instability.
Id. § 111 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. S 1823(c)(1}(C)). See also id. S 122 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1729(f)(1XC)).
The authority to purchase common stock was not included in the forms of assistance
that may be provided, thus precluding "emergency" nationalizations. Id. S 111, 122 (to
be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(B), 1729(f)(4)(B)).
" Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(2(c)(3), 1729(f)(2)-(3)). The FDIC and FSLIC
may guarantee the insured institution or the acquiring company against resulting loss to
facilitate mergers and consolidations. The Act, in addition, directs the insuring agencies
to report annually to Congress on their savings associated with exercise of the powers
of assistance.
" See SENATE REPORT, supra note 50, at 5.
' The FDIC may authorize the extraordinary acquisition of any closed commercial
bank with assets of at least $500 million or of any mutual savings bank with assets of at
least $500 million that is closed or in danger of closing. Act S 110 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. 5§ 1823(f)(2)(A), 1823(f)(3}A)(i)). The FSLIC may exercise such powers regardless of
the size of the thrift and upon a determination that "severe financial conditions" threaten
the stability of the thrift industry. Id. S 123(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. S 1730a(m)(1)(A}{i)).
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on an interstate and/or cross-industry basis." The Act requires the federal
agencies to consult with state regulators and provides that only a
unanimous vote of the federal agency's board may override a state objec-
tion. The Act establishes a bidding procedure under which bids resulting
in the lowest cost to the federal agency are to be accepted. As discussed
below, however, a complicated system of bid priorities, linked to the type
and geographic location of the acquiring institution, reduces, but does not
eliminate, the likelihood that these emergency acquisitions will produce
any appreciable interstate and cross-industry expansion. In fact, the Act
directs the FDIC and the FSLIC to "give consideration to . . . the
maintenance of specialized depository institutions" 8 in determining
whether to arrange extraordinary acquisitions.
Title II authorizes the FDIC and the FSLIC to utilize their respec-
tive insurance funds to "provide capital assistance to depository institu-
tions that have suffered earnings and capital losses primarily as a result
of their mortgage lending activities."69 Under this capital assistance pro-
gram, qualified federally-insured institutions may issue capital instruments
(net worth certificates) for purchase by the insuring agencies with pro-
missory notes. Title II is the result of a Conference Committee compromise,
in which the House discarded its guarantee concept for mortgage lenders"
in return for provisions prohibiting the insuring agencies from condition-
ing the purchase of net worth certificates on the institution's execution
of a merger resolution or on changes in the insured institution's manage-
ment. To qualify for net worth assistance, the institution must have, inter
alia, a net worth equal to or less than three percent of assets, incurred
losses during the previous two quarters, and residential mortgages total-
ing at least twenty percent of all loans. Title II authorizes a sliding scale
of assistance, although this may be altered by rule so long as the insuring
agencies do not purchase certificates covering an institution's entire
operating loss. Finally, net worth certificates may also be purchased from
non-insured institutions if the applicable state insurance fund agrees to
indemnify the federal insurance agency.
2. The Market Mechanism
While the emergency powers granted to the regulators are designed
"' The Act also permits emergency acquisitions of thrifts by bank holding companies,
reducing the regulatory delay typically associated with holding company acquisitions of
non-banks under the Bank Holding Company Act. The Act provides that, with the concur-
rence of the "primary federal regulator," the Federal Reserve Board may dispense with
the normal notice and hearing requirements attendant to nonbanking activity applications
under § 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act, upon a finding by the Board that "an
emergency exists which requires the Board to act immediately on any application... in-
volving a thrift institution . . ." Act § 118(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. S 1843(c)(8)). See
supra note 19 (explanation of 4(c)(8)).68Act S 116, 123 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. SS 1823(f)(6)(B),
1730a(m)(3)(B)).
Act § 116, 123 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. SS 1823(f)(6)(B), 1730(m)(3)(B)).
" CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 54, at 86.
70 H.R. 6267, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (Net Worth Guarantee Act).
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to provide short-term relief to the thrift industry, Garn-St Germain also
includes measures designed to improve the long-term competitive posi-
tion of thrifts. The Act's deregulation of thrift assets and liabilities powers
relies on a market-oriented approach similar to the approach applied to
regulatory reform in the airline and trucking industries. As thrift institu-
tions gradually implement these new powers, deposit disintermediation
and asset portfolio rigidity, the basic regulatory distortions that led to
the recent net worth crisis, should in the long-run be reduced significantly.
These asset and liabilities reforms, contained largely in Title III of
the Act, the "Thrift Institution Restructuring Act," 1 are quite varied.
Garn-St Germain directed the DIDC to establish an account for thrifts
and other depository institutions competitive with money market mutual
funds.7 The DIDC responded by authorizing two new accounts, the "money
market deposit account" 3 and the "Super NOW" account,74 and requesting
public comment on a proposed third account, the so-called "super money
market deposit account."7 Garn-St Germain also allows thrifts to offer
NOW accounts to federal, state, and local government, 6 to accept demand
deposits from persons who have a "business, corporate, commercial, or
agricultural loan relationship" with the institution,' and to issue securities,
,' Act §§ 301-55.
' Act § 327 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3503(c)(1)). Because market-rate deposit ac-
counts are federally insured, they may provide depository institutions with a competitive
advantage over money market mutual funds, assuming parity in the rates of interest offered.
" 47 Fed. Reg. 53,710 (1982) (codified at 12 C.F.R. S 1204.122(a)). The money market
deposit account has been available since December 14, 1982. It is federally insured, requires
a maintained average balance of $2,500, is not subject to interest rate or maturity regula-
tion, and has limited transaction features (only six transfers per month are permitted, of
which three may be by check).
" 47 Fed. Reg. 56,320 (1982) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 1204.122(a)). The Super NOW
account has been available since January 5, 1983. It may be offered to individual and govern-
mental customers, requires a maintained average balance of $2,500, and is not subject to
interest rate or maturity regulation.
, 47 Fed. Reg. 56,364 (1982). The super money market deposit account would be an
unlimited transaction account offering market interest rates, available to those ineligible
for the Super NOW account, primarily corporate customers. In March, 1983, the DIDC
postponed decision on this account. On August 4, 1983, the DIDC determined not to authorize
any interest-bearing transaction account available to corporate customers, in light of the
legal questions raised by the statutory bar against the payment of interest on demand
deposits. In a letter from DIDC Chairman Donald T. Regan to Senate Banking Committee
Chairman Garn and House Banking Committee Chairman St Germain, the DIDC stated
that, although the DIDC felt it could lawfully authorize such an account "in order to eliminate
the potential for protracted litigation, the Committee determined to present the issue of
paying interest on demand deposits to Congress" Letter from Donald Regan to Senator
Garn (Aug. 4, 1983).
" Act § 706 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. %S 1785(f}{2), 1832(a)(2)). These accounts previously
had been limited to individuals and non-government, non-profit organizations.
I Id. § 312 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)(1)). Section 312 also permits thrifts
to offer demand accounts to business customers "for the sole purpose of effectuating payments
thereto by a nonbusiness customer." Only commercial banks and mutual savings banks
previously had been able to accept demand deposits. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
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including debt obligations.78
Both thrifts and commercial banks benefit to some extent from the
Act's provisions widening sources of funds. The new money market deposit
account, for example, may be offered by all depository institutions. In re-
vising asset powers, Congress also included some minor relief for com-
mercial banks," but again focused primarily on thrift institutions. On the
asset side, the Garn-St Germain Act for the first time authorizes federally
chartered S&Ls and savings banks to make overdraft loans, to invest
in the accounts of other insured depository institutions,81 and to make
secured or unsecured commercial loans.2 The Act enhances the powers
of federally chartered thrifts to invest in the securities of state agencies
and corporations,' to make nonresidential real estate loans,' and to make
consumer and educational loans.85 The Act also adds some asset authority
for state-chartered institutions. First, the Act conclusively ends the legal
controversy surrounding the "due-on-sale" clause by preempting all state
due-on-sale clauses." Both federal and state thrifts should now be able
to accelerate the turnover of their residential mortgage portfolios. Sec-
ond, the Act permits non-federally chartered depository institutions, in-
cluding state-chartered commercial banks, to offer adjustable-rate or other
"alternative" mortgages,87 thus bringing these non-federally chartered in-
stitutions' powers in line with those previously granted federally chartered
institutions by regulation.88
B. Commercial Banks
Included within the regulatory and market-oriented measures dis-
cussed above are provisions that affect commercial banks, such as money
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963) ("Some commercial banking products or services are so distinc-
tive that they are entirely free of effective competition from products or services of other
financial institutions; the checking account is in this category").
"' Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. S 1464(b)(2)). Both the authority to issue securities
and the demand deposit authorization are, for jurisdictional reasons, limited to federally
chartered institutions.
" Id. 5 401 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. S 84). Section 401 raises slightly the lending
limits applicable to national banks. Id.
'o Id. 5 321 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §1464(c)(1}(A)).
8' Id. 5 323 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. S 1464(c)(1)(G)).
Id. 5 325 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. S 1464(c)(1)(R)).
Id. 5 324 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(H)).
, Id. 5 322 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. S 1464(c)(1)(B)).
Section 329 of the Act authorizes loans "reasonably incident to" the provision of
consumer credit and raises the investment limit on such loans to 30% of an institution's
assets. Act S 329 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. S 1464(c)(2)(B)).
Id. § 341. In Fidelity Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Cuesta, 101 S. Ct. 3014 (1982), the
Supreme Court previously had upheld the use of due-on-sales clauses by federally chartered
institutions.
' Act title VIII, SS 801-07, Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982.
' See 46 Fed. Reg. 39,124 (1981) (codified at 12 C.F.R. S 556.6(f)(1)(1982)).
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market deposit accounts, FDIC assistance for closed or failing banks, and
"extraordinary acquisitions" of closed commercial banks without regard
to the Douglas Amendment.89 The Act assists commercial banks in other
ways as well. Section 326 requires that the interest rate differential im-
posed by Regulation Q, which made commercial bank savings accounts
competitively disadvantageous for many potential customers, be phased
out on or before January 1, 1984.' Section 401(a) raises the lending limits
for commercial banks,9 which had restricted lending as inflation raised
nominal capital demands.92 Revisions to the banking affiliates provisions
of the Federal Reserve Act,3 among other things, liberalize existing restric-
tions on financial transactions between bank affiliates of multibank holding
companies. 4 Finally, section 411 exempts the first two million dollars of
"reservable liabilities" of member banks from the Federal Reserve Board's
reserve requirements."
C. Legislative Compromises
The immediate impact of the Garn-St Germain Act has been signifi-
cant. For example, in just the first three months of their existence, the
newly authorized money market accounts attracted over $300 billion in
deposits.8 Even discounting the wisdom bestowed only with hindsight,
however, criticism of the Act is justified nonetheless. In some respects,
the Act is a fairly lukewarm effort at deregulation of depository institu-
tions. In other respects, the Act is at loggerheads with the concept of
regulatory reform itself.
7
0 Act § 116 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(f)(4)(i)). See supra note 21 and accom-
panying text (discussion of Douglas Amendment).
I Id. 5 326(b). The 1986 phase-out of the deposit rate ceilings, mandated by the 1980
Act, is unaffected by the Garn-St Germain Act. See supra. note 46 and accompanying text.
" Act 5 401(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. S 84).
SENATE REPORT, supra note 50, at 25.
Federal Reserve Act S 23A, 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1976).
Act § 410(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. S 371c).
9' Id. 5 411. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. S 461b). The Senate version of § 411, which
would have eliminated all reserve requirements for depository institutions holding less than
$5 million in total deposits, was eliminated in conference. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note
54, at 90.
11 129 CONG. REC. S2332 (daily ed. March 8, 1983) (remarks of Sen. Garn). This deposit
inflow has helped to revive the housing market. S&L's wrote $21.6 billion worth of mort-
gage loans in the first quarter of 1983, compared with $9.3 billion a year ago. Finally Off
the Critical List, Tnsu May 23, 1983, at 38.
9, See SENATE REPORT, supra note 50, at 73 (additional views of Sen. Chafee)
Because of what it fails to do, I believe this bill is seriously deficient and un-
balanced. The dynamic and dramatic innovations sweeping the financial world
have been well-documented before this Committee, yet are ignored by this legisla-
tion .... We have had an opportunity to effect genuine reform that would ensure
a continued sound but flexible and competitive banking system .... Why, then,
after one and one-half years of examination and effort were these goals not
achieved?
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1. The "Deregulatory Imbalance"
As discussed previously, the maturity imbalance imposed on thrift
institutions by the traditional regulatory framework, which kept the cost
of funds and operating expenses above the fixed yields on assets, was
a major cause of the thrift industry's net worth crisis. Yet one effect,
however, of the Garn-St Germain Act is to continue a transitional im-
balance, begun with the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act, between the cost of funds and the return on assets.
In the short run, Garn-St Germain will raise markedly the cost of liabilities
for thrift institutions, which are already paying competitive interest rates
on a substantial portion of their deposits. Only over a much longer time
period will thrifts be able to utilize their new asset powers to diversify
their loan portfolios away from below-market fixed rate mortgages." In-
deed, if present trends are any indication, thrifts may exercise their asset
powers so cautiously in the new competitive environment that raising their
rate-of-return on assets may take longer than anticipated.9
The basic problem is that deregulation of asset powers should have
preceded deregulation of interest rates."0 Thrift assets cannot be im-
mediately "written up" to market value. Viewed in this light, the Act may
be seen as the final coup de grace for smaller and weaker thrifts. After
years of regulatory sheltering, these institutions now face a market en-
vironment of price competition in which only the efficient will survive.
Of course, with thrift net worth declining precipitously Congress did
not have the luxury of deregulating only assets. If Congress had not
checked disintermediation, the net worth crisis likely would have wor-
sened. Congress, in fact, recognized that the plight of the thrift industry
was so severe that the restructuring of the most unstable institutions
would have to take the form of direct "net worth" assistance and federally
encouraged mergers."1 Nonetheless, in the next several years this transi-
The liabilities of thrift institutions, because they are primarily short-term instruments,
adjust more quickly to changing interest rates than do asset portfolios. Carron, supra note
34, at 13.
See, e.g., Noble, Thrift Units: Caurious Rivals, New York Times, May 23, 1983, at
D1, col. 1 ("Despite clamoring for the additional powers, most savings and loan associations
and mutual savings banks are moving gingerly into the riskier-and potentially more
profitable-arena of commercial banking"); Horvitz, Thrift Institutions and Commercial Lend-
ing, AMERICAN BANKER, April 5,1983, at 4, col. 1 ("Commercial lending authority is irrelevant
to most savings and loans. These associations are in markets without much potential for
such activity or in which the market is already highly competitive").
On the other hand, the influx of new funds has helped to cut operating losses dramatical-
ly. During the last six months of 1982, federally insured thrifts experienced operating losses
of $994 million, down from $3.3 billion in the first half of the year. See "Washington Business,"
Washington Post, July 4, 1983, at 3.
10 See Carron, supra note 34, at 42 ("Proper concern for transition problems would
have argued for deregulation of long-term liabilities and the asset side well before lifting
rate ceilings on short-term deposits, because the return on the mortgage portfolio adjusts
more slowly").




tional imbalance may exacerbate the financial positions of many institutions
by raising, rather than reducing, costs. If interest rates remain at their
current relatively low level, the net worth certificate program and the
emergency regulatory powers may prove adequate to meet the immediate
thrift industry crisis and buy time for long-run readjustment. Ironically,
therefore, the Garn-St Germain Act gambles on the same market risk
that accompanied the 1980 Act. If interest rates skyrocket again, the new
powers will not have sufficient time to raise thrifts' earnings and restore
their competitiveness. The eventual success or failure of the Garn-St Ger-
main Act, which owes its existence largely to a period of sustained high
interest rates, could well depend on an even longer period of sustained
low interest rates.
2. Protectionist Measures
Market conditions facing Congress in 1982 may not have permitted
comprehensive reform of the financial services industry. Nevertheless,
even if time were of the essence, the degree to which several provisions
of the Act depart from current notions of what "deregulation" entails is
striking. In at least three areas the Garn-St Germain Act epitomizes the
adage that legislation is, in essence, "reactive." This reactive legislation
is exemplified in incentives for thrift institutions to exercise their new
assets powers, interstate and cross-industry "emergency" acquisitions, and
commercial bank competition with non-depository institutions.
The expansion of the investment powers of thrift institutions contained
in the Act clearly is not intended to supplant the traditional division be-
tween the thrift and commercial banking industries. Commercial loans
and other thrift asset powers remain subject to percentage-of-asset limita-
tions. Indeed, the Act recites that the asset powers are conferred "to pro-
vide [thrift] institutions the flexibility necessary to maintain their role
of providing credit for housing."'" Although this asset limitation is a serious
deficiency in itself, since thrifts will remain precluded from fully competing
in the credit markets, the Act in some ways reinforces existing disincen-
tives to asset expansion by thrift institutions.
Research has shown that state-chartered thrift institutions that have
been granted the power to diversify their asset portfolios generally have
made little use of such authority.' A major reason for this lack of diver-
The new asset and liability powers are potentially important for the long-run resolu-
tion of the thrifts' problems. This long-run solution can occur, however, only if
the short term crisis is avoided. In this respect, the [Aiet's emergency provisions
are important.
Economic Perspectives, supra note 43, at 13.
in Act § 311 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. S 1464(a)).
"= Since June 1980, state chartered S&L's in Florida have enjoyed the power to make
commercial loans and to invest in corporate and governmental securities. A study conducted
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, however, found that "in the short-run Florida
chartered associations have done very little to exercise the expanded authority their state
13311983]
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sification is existing federal tax policy, which provides a substantial tax
deduction for thrifts that hold at least eighty-two percent of their assets
in qualified form, mainly residential mortgages, cash and federal
securities."' Assets replacing mortgages in a thrift's portfolio typically
do not carry interest rates sufficiently high to overcome the tax advan-
tage of this so-called "bad debt deduction."'' 5
Notwithstanding that the FHLBB already had permitted the inter-
state deployment of remote service units by thrifts,' and was apparently
prepared to authorize other forms of interstate expansion by federally
chartered S&Ls,"' section 334 of the Act prohibits interstate branching
by such institutions if the institutions do not qualify for the bad debt
deduction. 8 Similarly, section 335 limits the permissible activities of S&L
holding companies whose S&L subsidiaries do not qualify for the
deduction."9 As a result, Garn-St Germain reinforces the effect of tax
policies which discourage investment by thrift institutions in assets other
than residential mortgage loans. Federal thrift institutions that exercise
their new powers to diversify their asset portfolios face both an increase
in tax liability and statutory restrictions on interstate expansion,"' as well
as the possibility of legally mandated divestitures. These provisions passed
without a word of justification in the legislative history. They are, however,
flatly inconsistent with the goal of encouraging the diversification of thrift
assets into higher-yield, competitive investments.
A second compromise measure is the authorization for federal-
statutes provide them." Baker, Florida S&L's Use of Expanded Powers, Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta, Economic Review (July 1982), at 15.
' I.R.C. SS 593, 7701(aX19)(E) (1976). These tax provisions are referred to as the "bad
debt deduction" because they permit a deduction of a proportion of taxable income as an
addition to the qualifying institution's bad debt reserves. This bad debt deduction is effec-
tively a reduction in the tax rate for those institutions that qualify, since it greatly exceeds
any reasonable expectation of loss. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Report of the
Interagency Task Force on Thrift Institutions 107 (June 1980).
105 See id. at 110-13 (bad debt deduction is thus "a powerful disincentive to diversify").
'" See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, § 304,
12 U.S.C. S 1464(b)(1) (1976) (codifying authority). "Remote service units (RSUs)" is the
FHLBB's term for ATMs.
See supra note 25.
100 Act S 334 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(r)(1)). Section 334 also adds an exemp-
tion, similar to the Douglas Amendment, allowing interstate expansion when state law per-
mits. Present interstate branches are grandfathered, and institutions have up to two years
to divest offending branches. Id.
10 Id. § 335 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. S 1730a(n)). Holding companies are given three
years "to either come into conformance or sell the S&L subsidiary." SENATE REPORT, supra
note 49, at 18.
1' The FHLBB retains the authority to permit thrifts unaffected by these provisions
of the Garn-St Germain Act to expand on an interstate basis. See supra note 25 (regulations
permitting statewide S&L branching). Moreover, the FHLBB recently has promulgated
regulations, in implementation of the Act's state law exemption. See supra, note 107. These
regulations permit acquisition and establishment of out-of-state branches where authorized
by state law. 48 Fed. Reg. 20,930 (1983).
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ly-sanctioned "emergency acquisitions" of financially troubled or closed
institutions. Congress specifically noted that such acquisitions would be
permitted notwithstanding interstate branching restrictions and limita-
tions on holding company expansion, and would be permitted by non-
depository institutions."' However, two factors significantly limit the likely
impact of this authorization on interstate and cross-industry expansion.
First, the authorizations sunset after three years," giving little time for
them to serve as a real vehicle for lowering geographic and industry bar-
riers. Second, the Act mandates restrictive bidding procedures weighted
disproportionately in favor of in-state institutions of the same type as the
acquired institution. After the first round of bidding, if the bid resulting
in the lowest cost to the federal insurance agency is not from "an in-state
like-type institution as the failing institution,"'1 persons submitting bids
within a specified range of the low-cost bid may submit new bids."" After
the second round, the Act directs "priorities" of bids that favor both in-
state depository institutions and institutions of the same type as the ac-
quired institution." 5 Thus, while ostensibly favoring geographic and cross-
industry expansion, the Act maintains with only minor modification the
traditional and inefficient geographic and product distinctions that have
limited the development of the financial sector in the last half century.
With regard to asset powers, commercial banks clearly did not receive
what they sought from Congress, namely the power to engage in full-
service brokerage activities and to underwrite municipal revenue bonds,
corporate bonds, and equity securities."6 In one important area, however,
commercial banks received what they probably had not bargained for,
... SENATE REPORT, supra, note 50, at 47, 49. Several portions of the Act permit acquisi-
tions by out-of-state institutions. See, e.g., Act S 116 (acquisitions exempt from the Douglas
Amendment, § 3(d) of the Bank Holding Company Act); id. § 123(a) (acquisitions by "any
other insured institution or any insured bank" permitted "[n]otwithstanding any provision
of the laws [except the antitrust laws]"). To this extent, the "extraordinary acquisitions"
authorized by Garn-St Germain confirm existing regulatory policy respecting failing institu-
tions. See Interstate Financial Corp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 316 (1982) (permitting acquisition
of failing thrift by bank holding company).
"I Act S 141(a)(3), (7).
113 SENATE REPORT, supra. note 50, at 47; see also id. at 49.
"' Act §§ 116, 123 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1823(f}(6)(A), 1730a(m)(3)(A).
1 Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. SS 1823(fX6)(B), 1730a(m)(3(B)). The order of priority
is: same-state, same-type; different-state, same-type; same-state, different-type; different-
state, different-type. In addition, the Act is intended to grant priority to institutions in
adjoining states if the agency "goes outside the in-state bidding tiers." SENATE REPORT,
supra note 50, at 47, 49.
"' Title III of S. 1720, the bill initially introduced by Senator Garn in 1981, would have
amended the Glass-Steagall Act to permit federally chartered banks to deal in, and under-
write, revenue obligations, issued, guaranteed by, or on behalf of a state or state political
subdivision, and would have amended the Investment Company Act of 1940, 12 U.S.C. §
80a-1 et seq. (1970), to enable any commercial bank, thrift institution or depository institu-
tion holding company to operate investment companies and to underwrite and distribute
the securities of investment companies. Another bill introduced during the 97th Congress
would have authorized bank holding companies to engage in limited securities activities
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significant restrictions on the insurance activities of bank holding com-
panies. Section 601 of the Act amends section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding
Company Act 117 to provide that "it is not closely related to banking or
managing or controlling banks for a bank holding company to provide in-
surance as a principal, agent or broker .... "118 Although six enumerated
exemptions grandfather certain insurance activities previously authorized
by regulations of the Federal Reserve Board,... the primary effect of sec-
tion 601 is to prohibit "substantive expansion" by banking organizations
into the insurance business.10 Again, the legislative history provides no
justification for this new restriction. In a decade in which non-depository
financial institutions increasingly are engaging in de facto banking not-
withstanding the Glass-Steagall Act, and in which insurance/brokerage
combinations such as Prudential/Bache and Sears are positioning
themselves to offer so-called "total financial planning," new restrictions
on commercial bank and bank holding company activities only can further
hamstring their competitiveness and profitability. From both a competitive
and policy perspective, section 601 is an anachronism.
Each of these three areas is merely symbolic of the fact that, for all
its significance as a regulatory reform measure, the Garn-St Germain Act
takes only a few steps toward substantive reform of financial services
regulation. Given the exigencies of the thrift net worth crisis and the real-
ity of political accommodation, breaks in the neatly-compartmentalized
regulatory framework were permitted only to the extent necessary to
preserve the financial viability of depository institutions. For example,
thrift institutions may now accept demand deposits, but not from general
commercial customers 2 ' and the traditional domain of commercial banks
is not threatened substantially. Although the Act modifies the traditional
specialization of financial institutions, it does not fundamentally change,
through affiliates, and would have authorized the Federal Reserve Board to allow holding
companies to engage in any activity of a "financial" nature under S 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding
Company Act, 12 U.S.C. S 1843(c)(8). See S. 2490, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (the Bank Holding
Company Deregulation Act of 1982). Although both attempts at modification of the Glass-
Steagall Act were tabled in the 97th Congress, the Reagan Administration reintroduced
the concept with a bill drafted by the Treasury Department that largely paralleled the
1982 bills. See S. 1609, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (Financial Institutions Deregulation Act);
Garn Supports Bank Deregulation Idea, New York Times, July 19, 1983, at D5, col. 3. As
of the date this article went to print, S. 1609 had not been reported out of the Senate Bank-
ing Committee.
117 12 U.S.C. S 1843(c)(8) (1976).
118 Act S 601.
19 See Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors, 533 F.2d 224 (5th Cir.
1976), on rehearing, 558 F.2d 729 (1977), cert.denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
120 SENATE REPORT, supra note 50, at 37. The exemptions permit bank holding companies
to engage in, among other things, credit life, disability, and involuntary unemployment in-
surance activities and general insurance agency activities in small towns. Section 601,
however, prohibits the underwriting or sale of property and casualty insurance products.
ll See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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and in some ways the Act reinforces, that regulatory enforced
specialization.
III. THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY REFORM
By enacting a potpourri of measures including direct operating sub-
sidies, asset expansion and relaxed merger restrictions, Congress sought
to avoid the short-term problem of thrift institution failures without being
forced to address the underlying problem directly. With accelerating
homogenization of financial markets and institutions, and with depositors
becoming increasingly sophisticated in their choice of alternative finan-
cial instruments, the specialized local thrift institution already may have
become a thing of the past." The thrift industry, indeed the entire finan-
cial services industry, is undergoing and will continue to undergo a major
transformation and shakeout.
Regulatory distortions, magnified by fundamental economic and
technological changes, are the catalysts for this transformation. Regulatory
attempts to compartmentalize institutions and to structure competition
along prescribed lines create-perverse incentives" and straightjacket the
ability of the regulated firms to respond to market changes. The effects
have been felt not only in the thrift industry, but throughout the regulated
financial services industry. While commercial banks have been restricted
in their services and products, non-depository financial institutions have
developed interest-bearing transaction and investment accounts and have
expanded their activities nationwide without regulatory barriers. Although
some balance has been added recently, as in the Federal Reserve Board's
approval of BankAmerica's acquisition of Charles Schwab Corp., a dis-
count brokerage firm,' the primary regulatory barriers remain.
Much can be said, of course, for an approach to regulatory reform
that involves a measured transition to competition. As discussed
previously," rapid deregulation may itself create competitive imbalances.
However, that should not obscure the realization that the Garn-St Ger-
main Act is not all the legislation that is necessary to remove artificial
barriers to competition in the financial services industry. Of the tradi-
12 See Carron, supra note 34, at 85.
1 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
12 See BankAmerica Corp., 69 FED. RES. BULL. 105 (1983), affd sub nom, Securities In-
dustry Ass'n v. Board of Governors, No. 83-1019 (2d Cir. July 15, 1983). The BankAmerica
decision has prompted other commercial banks to move into the discount brokerage business.
Chase Manhattan Corporation acquired Chicago-based discount broker Rose & Company
in February, 1983. Citicorp began offering discount brokerage service at its retail branches
in New York in February, and has announced plans to expand the service to all its New
York branches. See McMurray, Citi Expands Broker Services to 275 Branches, AMERICAN
BANKER, June 21,1983, at 1 col. 2. The Federal Reserve Board recently has proposed amend-
ments to Regulation Y to permit bank holding company affiliates generally to engage in
securities brokerage and securities credit lending. See 48 Fed. Reg. 7746 (Feb. 24, 1983);
12 C.F.R. 5 225.4 (1982) (Regulation Y).
1"2 See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
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tional forms of financial services regulation, only one, price regulation,
has been substantially eliminated. The Garn-St Germain Act modifies a
second traditional form of regulation, restrictions on competition in prod-
ucts and services but primarily for thrift institutions only. The restric-
tions of the Glass-Steagall Act remain, and the barriers to geographic ex-
pansion by depository instructions largely are intact. Competitive and
technological forces, as well as what appears to be a basic change in public
policy with respect to economic regulation,12 eventually should lead to





The McFadden Act and the Douglas Amendment restrict interstate
activities of commercial banks and bank holding companies." The National
Housing Act and regulatory policy restrict interstate expansion of thrifts
and S&L holding companies." The "protections" actually afforded by these
measures, however, are becoming increasingly ephemeral. As im-
provements in telecommunications and transportation have integrated
national commerce, large bank holding companies have been able to devise
lawful means of providing consumer finance services, management ser-
vices, and trust services through interstate subsidiaries." The geographic
restrictions thus do not eliminate all interstate competition, but merely
hobble banking organizations in their ability to compete. Institutions are
structured, and services are provided, not on the basis of efficiency, but
rather along the lines mandated by regulatory limitations.
Regulatory interpretation of these geographic restrictions also has
been muddled and inconsistent. For example, automatic teller machines
(ATMs), which hold the potential to revolutionize the delivery of financial
services and already account for a significant portion of consumer trans-
actions, have been held to be "branches" within the scope of the McFad-
den Act.' The FHLBB, on the other hand, has ruled that federally
121 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
12 For a more complete discussion of these issues, see Gorinson, Depository Institution
Regulatory Reform in the 1980s: The Issue of Geographic Restrictions, 28 ANTITRUST BULL.
227 (Spring 1983).
" See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
12 See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
"' By the close of the 1970s, BankAmerica and Citicorp, the two largest bank holding
companies, had operations in over 40 states. See Rhodes, The Competitive Effects of Interstate
Banking, 66 FED. RES. BULL. 1 (1980).
131 See Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 862 (1976). The result created by the McFadden Act in this area becomes all the more
apparent when differences exist between national and state banks in the freedom of banks
to employ ATMs. State law may not consider an ATM a branch but the McFadden Act
treats ATMs as branches, thus placing national banks at a competitive disadvantage with
state-chartered institutions.Under the ruling in Independent Bankers, however, an ATM is
considered a "branch" only if it is owned or leased by the bank in question. See Indepen-
dent Bankers, 534 F.2d at 951. This ownership requirement makes possible interstate ATM
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chartered S&Ls can utilize ATMs on an interstate basis.132 Recently, both
the FDIC and the Federal Reserve Board concluded that a commercial
bank that disposes of the bank's commercial loan portfolio is no longer
a "bank" within the meaning of the Bank Holding Company Act, thus allow-
ing interstate expansion on that basis.m
The practical impact of the geographic restrictions, which were in-
tended to protect consumers by preventing "undue" concentration in the
banking industry, is perverse. In the wholesale banking market, these
restraints at best have succeeded only in slowing the advent of nation-
wide banking for commercial customers. Through loan production offices
and other devices, commercial banks for some years have offered finan-
cial services to large corporate customers on a nationwide basis.'34
Geographic restrictions today primarily affect competition in the provi-
sion of banking services to individuals and small business customers who
do not and cannot have realistic banking alternatives outside their own
localities. The byzantine structure created by these crazy-quilt restric-
tions has maintained highly concentrated local banking markets, 5 and
has worked to the disadvantage of consumers, the group traditionally least
able to afford substitutes for the services of depository institutions. Repeal
or reform of these restrictions likely would lead to lower concentration
at the local level, where increased competition would help ensure that
prices were kept low and services remained high.
Recent steps taken by states to reduce interstate banking barriers,
such as state authority for de novo chartering of banks and bank holding
company subsidiaries for limited purposes,"'8 eventually may lower bar-
sharing arrangements and ATM networks, through which banks can offer services to
customers in areas in which they lawfully could not establish a bank or locate a proprietary
ATM. See Bennett & Sabbarese, Shared ATM Networks: The Nation and the Southeast, Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Economic Review (December 1982), at 32-42 (discussion of ATM
sharing agreements).
1 12 C.F.R. S 545.4-2(c)(1983). Automatic teller machines are referred to as "remote
service units" by th FHLBB.
' See infra note 138.
',, See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
See Heggestad & Mingo, The Competitive Condition of U.S. Banking Markets and
the Impact of Structural Reform, 32 J. FINANCE 649, 656 (1977.
18 South Dakota has authorized bank holding companies to operate subsidiaries engaged
in credit card and insurance activities. Delaware permits the formation of a single office
of an out-of-state bank. Maine, Massachusetts and New York have enacted "reciprocity"
statutes permitting the establishment of bank subsidiaries by out-of-state holding companies
if the holding company's state also permits out-of-state entry. Reciprocal interstate bank-
ing laws, which represent an exercise by states of the power reserved to them under the
Douglas Amendment, generally permit entry de novo or by acquisition and are not limited
to specific banking activities. In the last several years, New York's Citicorp has established
limited-purpose banks in South Dakota and Delaware, and plans to charter a de novo full-
service bank subsidiary in Maine. See Citicorp Plans Bank in Maine, AMERICAN BANKER,
March 28, 1983, at 1 col. 4. See Watts-Fitzgerald, Nonvoting Stock Investments-The Advent
of Interstate Banking, 38 Bus. LAW. 1449, 1451-58 (1983) (review of recent developments in
state law relating to bank holding company expansion).
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riers throughout the nation. Unfortunately, the parochial interests of state
legislatures and the existence of powerful state banking lobbies suggest
that such a development is not likely in the near future. 7 In the interim,
the continued costs of the existing barriers, particularly in restricting com-
petition between commercial banks and nationwide non-depository finan-
cial institutions providing bank-like services,'38 is too high a price for the
industry and the economy to pay.
As William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division, stated recently, "the time has come for repeal of the
McFadden Act and the Douglas Amendment to permit depository institu-
tions to expand where competitive opportunities appear. '"" No valid reason
exists for continuing the present unsatisfactory situation or for prohibiting
efficient interstate competition in the financial services industry. At the
very least, two measures clearly are necessary in the immediate context
of industry transformation. First, statewide branching by national banks
should be permitted to give national banks the same branching authority
which federally chartered S&Ls already have in their own states. Second,
the McFadden Act should be amended to exempt ATMs and other forms
of EFT technology from the Act's coverage to encourage the efficient
development of interstate ATM networks. 40 Until anachronistic limits on
geographic expansion are eliminated, competition in the financial services
industry will remain artificially restricted and consumers will be precluded
from realizing the full benefits of technological development.
B. The Glass-Steagall Act
Senator Garn's original bill would have liberalized the restrictions of
the Glass-Steagall Act by permitting commercial banks to deal in and to
underwrite state and municipal revenue obligations. As discussed
previously,' this initiative was eliminated as part of the essential com-
13 See, e.g., California Bankers Fight Reciprocal Bill, AMERICAN BANKER, May 17,1983,
at 2 col. 2. (California Bankers Association, for the second time in five years, is opposing
efforts to permit reciprocal bank ownership by bank holding companies).
1 Brokerage house and securities firms are not subject to any restrictions on interstate
expansion. In addition, these firms recently have been permitted to acquire depository in-
stitutions. For example, Dreyfus Corporation's acquisition of Lincoln State Bank of East
Orange, New Jersey, has been approved by the FDIC. See FDICDefends Dreyfuis Bank Ruling,
AMERICAN BANKER, Jan. 5, 1983, at 1. The device used for this acquisition was the "nonbank
bank." By divesting its commercial loan portfolio, Lincoln State is no longer considered
a bank within the meaning of the Bank Holding Company Act. See 12 U.S.C. 5 1841(c) (1976);
supra note 24. Citing "disorderly developments" in the financial services industry, the Federal
Reserve Board recently drafted legislation that would place a moratorium on the acquisi-
tion of banks and thrifts by nonbanking companies such as Dreyfus. See Fed Proposes Merger
Halt, New York Times, June 24, 1983, at D2, col. 3.
13 Testimony of William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, at
7 (June 8, 1983)[hereinafter cited as "Baxter Testimony"].
1 Id. at 7-8.
1 See supra notes 5, 54, and accompanying text.
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promise that secured passage of the Garn-St Germain Act. However, the
extremely rapid transformations now occurring make reform of Glass-
Steagall a top priority.
Non-depository financial institutions are able to offer an extensive
array of bank-like services at market rates, free from geographic restraints,
reserve requirements and other restrictions applicable to depository in-
stitutions, such as maturity and account balance minimums. Coupled with
utilization of advanced telecommunications technology, this freedom has
changed forever the competitive structure of the financial services
marketplace. For example, Sears combines in one financial sector Allstate
Savings and Loan Association, Allstate Insurance, the securities firm of
Dean Whitter Reynolds and the real estate firm of Coldwell Banker. Recent
mergers between the American Express Company and Shearson Loeb
Rhodes and between the Prudential Insurance Company and the securities
firm of Bache Halsey Stuart Shields are well known. These integrated
financial services firms are placing increased competitive pressure on com-
mercial banks and other depository institutions, which are precluded from
offering similar "one-step" financial convenience.
In recent years commercial banks have been testing the outer con-
fines of the Glass-Steagall Act."' Other liberalizations have occurred
through judicial decisions." However, as with geographic restrictions, the
industry divisions mandated by the Glass-Steagall Act are becoming in-
creasingly obsolete and have fostered methods of conducting business that
exist because of legal obligations rather than economic efficiency.144 The
assault of non-depository financial institutions on the traditional banking
domain has demonstrated that competitive entry in the financial services
industry increases innovation and results in the offering of financial ser-
vices to consumers at the lowest possible cost.
On the other hand, the limitation of commercial bank activities has
hindered their attempts to remain competitive with non-traditional finan-
cial institutions. Perhaps commercial banks have been sheltered from true
price and service competition for so long that they cannot successfully
compete. If that is the case, repeal or modification of the Glass-Steagall
Act, might induce some bank failures. The remedy for any failures deemed
14 One example of this is the development by commercial banks of so-called "sweep
accounts,' which would hold deposits in a normal savings or transaction account and
automatically "sweep" funds above a specified minimum into a money market mutual fund.
See Shockey & Kurucza, Glass-SteagaU Issues Raised by "Sweep" Programs, Legal Times,
October 11, 1982, at 13, col. 1. In September, 1982, the Securities Industry Association peti-
tioned the Federal Reserve Board to halt the operation of sweep accounts by national banks.
Petition of the Securities Industry Ass'n, In re Sweep Accounts (filed Sept. 10 1982). With
the authorization of money market deposit accounts by the Garn-St Germain Act, the in-
centive for use of such accounts by commercial banks has not been eliminated.
" See A.G. Becker Inc. v. Board of Governors, 693 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1982XGlass-Steagall
Act does not prohibit commercial banks from marketing third-party commercial paper), cert.
granted, - U.S.L.W. __ (1983).
"' See Baxter Testimony, supra note 139, at 9.
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undesirable for policy reasons, however, is contained in existing deposit
insurance protections. By using artificial restrictions on competition as
an indirect means of ensuring the "safety and soundness" of banking in-
stitutions, the Glass-Steagall Act creates regulatory distortions that
outweigh whatever marginal benefit the Act provides to the security of
bank depositors. Having moved closer to a competitive financial services
industry with the Garn-St Germain Act, the time has come to reconsider
the regulatory reforms which were postponed in the crisis surrounding
the thrift industry.
C. Deposit Insurance
A third area of regulation that merits reconsideration in the wake
of the Garn-St Germain Act is deposit insurance. Commentators of varied
persuasion 14 5 have recognized that federal insurance of accounts in
depository institutions is a major factor in the stability of the American
banking system. However, the introduction of increased competition to
the financial services industry, both among depository institutions and
betweendepository and non-depository financial institutions, may provide
the basis for significant change in the current system of deposit insurance.
Federal deposit insurance guarantees depositors that, in the event
of an institution's failure, depositors will receive the full par value of their
insured deposits. The maximum insured value on any one account has been
raised progressively to today's level of one hundred thousand dollars.
Premiums for deposit insurance, however, are leveled on insured
institutions146 in proportion to their total deposits, even though not all
deposits are insured and not all institutions are equally risky and likely
to become insolvent. 47 Moreover, the federal insurance agencies have
handled practically all large institution failures through the mechanism
of the "purchase and assumption" transaction which insures that no
depositor, regardless of the dollar value of his account, incurs a loss. '48
These two practices are likely to become increasingly hard to defend
as competition in the financial services industry accelerates. For exam-
ple, it is well-recognized that uniform insurance premiums have encouraged
depository institutions to assume additional risk, to earn the higher return
typically associated with riskier investments, at no additional insurance
15 See J. K. GALBRAITH, MONEY: WHENCE IT CAME, WHERE IT WENT (1975); M. FRIEDMAN,
A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1963).
1.. Only a very small proportion of banks and thrifts are not insured by either the
FDIC of FSLIC. See supra note 18. All of these institutions are insured by state insurance
funds.
" See Economic Perspectives, supra note 43, at 21. Thus, conservative banks, and banks
with a smaller proportion of insured to total deposits, effectively subsidize the insurance
costs of other banks. Id.
148 See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Deposit Insurance in a Changing En-
vironment, at I-1, 111-4 (1983}[hereinafter cited as "Deposit Insurance"]. Until Penn Square
Bank failed in mid-1982, no bank with assets of $100 million had been dissolved by means
of a payoff of insured deposits. Id- at 1-2.
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costs."' The Garn-St Germain Act itself encourages thrift institutions to
embark into riskier enterprises, most notably commercial loans. As com-
mercial banks encounter increased competition from non-depository finan-
cial institutions, they will face even more pressure to maintain profit
margins and increase risk levels. Increased competition and risk by defini-
tion mean an increased failure rate among depository institutions.
As the financial services industry passes through the present transi-
tional phase, the industry is rapidly becoming "a more risk-intensive, less-
constrained environment that is likely to be less forgiving of faulty finan-
cial and credit judgments."' As the FDIC has recognized, such a risk-
intensive environment is no longer easily harmonized with an insurance
system in which "banks' exposure to market discipline is greatly
diminished." ' Nor is it easily harmonized with a system that discourages
customers of depository institutions from evaluating the comparative risk
of alternative institutions. By routinely protecting all depositors, including
depositors with accounts in excess of the one hundred thousand dollar
maximum, the federal deposit insurance agencies have contributed to a
situation in which consumers invest in deposit accounts without regard
to the profitability or financial stability of the institution in which they
have invested their funds.
A variety of methods exist by which the current system of deposit
insurance could be modified, including risk-related insurance premiums,
"loss-sharing" through reduction or elimination of protection for uninsured
and underinsured accounts, optional "excess" insurance, and increased
reliance on private deposit insurance. These and other alternatives en-
compass different political and economic trade-offs that are beyond the
scope of this article. Whatever the eventual direction chosen by Congress,
that consideration has already begun. The Garn-St Germain Act directed
the FDIC, the FSLIC and the NCUA each to conduct a study of "the cur-
rent system of deposit insurance and its impact on the structure and opera-
tions of depository institutions,''1 52 including the feasibility of risk-related
insurance and other reforms. On April 15, 1983, these reports were
transmitted to Congress, where the issue now lies.
D. Antitrust Considerations
Antitrust law is a final area that likely will be modified in the wake
of Garn-St Germain. Two areas deserve discussion. First, the Act's
expansion of the investment powers of thrift institutions indicates that
over time thrifts are likely to offer increased, although still limited, com-
petition to commercial banks. This suggests that changes may be ap-
propriate in the definition of banking product markets for antitrust pur-
1,1 See, e.g., Economic Perspectives, supra note 43, at 21.
11 Deposit Insurance, supra note 148, at 111-3.
Id. at III-1.
15 Act S 712(a)(1).
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poses. Second, as the financial services industry continues its restructur-
ing phase, the complex regulatory procedures for review and approval
of bank mergers, established by the Bank Merger Act of 1960, likely will
prove increasingly unworkable and should be eliminated.
1. Financial Product Markets
As recently as 1974, the Supreme Court held that commercial banks
and thrift institutions did not compete in the same "line of commerce,
or product market, for the purpose of determining whether a merger be-
tween commercial banks violated section 7 of the Clayton Act.' In United
States v. Connecticut National Bank the Court stated:
At some stage in the development of savings banks it will be
unrealistic to distinguish them from commercial banks for pur-
poses of the Clayton Act. In Connecticut, that point may well be
reached when and if savings banks become significant participants
in the marketing of bank services to commercial enterprises. But,
in adherence to the tests set forth in our earlier bank merger cases,
which we are constrained to follow, we hold that such a point has
not yet been reached."
Since that time the federal regulatory agencies have begun to recognize
that the "cluster" of products and services offered by commercial banks
has become less unique than it once was, prompting the agencies' evalua-
tion, "in particular cases," of competition between commercial banks and
thrift institutions.
1 55
With the advent of the Garn-St Germain Act, however, thrift institu-
tions are authorized to provide almost the same range of products and
services offered by commercial banks. Indeed, because thrifts can now
accept demand deposits and make commercial loans, the traditional
hallmarks of a commercial bank," the Act amends the definition of "bank"
in the Bank Holding Company Act 51 to declare that thrift institutions are
not "banks."' 5 Simply put, thrifts have now reached the point at which
they are poised to become "significant participants" in the marketing of
53 15 U.S.C. S 18 (1976).
"' United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 666 (1974). For a general
discussion, see Austin, The Evolution of Commercial Bank Merger Antitrust Law, 36 Bus.
LAW. 297 (1981); ABA Section on Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 87-95 (1975).
"' See, e.g., United Bank Corp., 67 FED. RES. BULL. 358 (1981); Decision of the Comptroller
of the Currency on the Application to Merge the Connecticut National Bank, Bridgeport, Con-
necticut, into Hartford Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., Hartford, Connecticut, at 9 (March 26,
1982). See generally Remarks by Stanley M. Gorinson before the Illinois Institute for Con-
tinuting Legal Education on Multi-Bank Holding Companies, Chicago, Illinois, September
9, 1981.
" See supra note 24.
" Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, § 2(c), 12 U.S.C. S 1841(c)(1976).
"' Act § 333 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 5 1841(c)).
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services to commercial customers. Thus, if Connecticut National Bank
retains any validity today, which the authors believe it does not, its days
clearly are numbered.
This development has significant consequences for antitrust analysis.
First, it indicates that thrift institutions and commercial banks should be
considered in the same product market for antitrust purposes. The weight
that thrift institutions should be given in analyzing the competitive effect
of a merger should depend on the degree to which, in any particular
geographic market, thrifts actually exercise their new powers to compete
with commercial banks over the full range of banking services.159 Second,
and analogously, product markets in depository institution mergers can
no longer be defined simply by reference to the nature of the merging
institutions, but rather must be defined by reference to the nature of
specific types of products and services and the customers to whom they
are offered. 60 This is the approach taken by the Department of Justice
in its most recent bank merger cases. The Department has argued that
the competitive impact of a depository institution merger must be assessed
in the two markets of "wholesale" banking and "retail" banking."1
More generally, the inclusion of both commercial banks and thrifts
in wholesale and retail banking product markets should permit more re-
fined evaluation of the scope of effective competition in financial services.
As thrifts exercise their new powers, consumers will be able to choose
among a greater array of competitive alternatives. The increase in the
number and variety of actual and potential competitors indicates that many
mergers that might have been challenged in the past may now take on
a more neutral cast, thereby permitting expansion through merger or con-
solidation with a lessened risk of antitrust exposure.
I19 The Garn-St Germain Act places a capacity constraint on thrifts in their exercise
of their new commercial lending powers. Thrifts can invest up to 5% of their assets in
commercial loans until January 1, 1984, and up to a limit of 10% thereafter. Act S 325 (to
be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c}(1)(R)). Thus, in commercial lending activities thrifts are
not yet full competitors to commercial banks. This limitation also should be considered in
assessing the weight that should be given to thrift institutions in analyzing the relevant
product market in a commercial bank merger.
'1 See Note, The Line of Commerce for Commercial Bank Mergers: A Product-Oriented
Redefinition, 96 HARV. L. Rav. 90 (1983).
"'1 The Department has defined retail banking as "all banking services offered to in-
dividual customers, including: time deposits, savings deposits, transaction accounts, con-
sumer loans and residential mortgage loans:' Wholesale banking is defined as "all banking
services offered to commercial customers, including: demand deposits, time deposits, trans-
actions accounts, savings deposits and commercial loans:' United States v. National Bank
& Trust Co. of Norwich, No. 83-CV-537 (N.D.N.Y. filed May 6, 1983). See also United States
v. Virginia Nat'l Bankshares, 1982-2 Trade Cas. , 64,871 (W.D. V i. 1982).
This approach has suffered somewhat from a lack of sufficient data on specific services
and customers, necessitating the continued use of proxies, such as total deposits, because
more accurate data is generally unavailable. However, the analytical approach is correct
and, given the changes in permissible banking activities wrought by Garn-St Germain and
the 1980 Act, these difficulties in data collection are unavoidable.
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2. Regulatory Merger Review
One legacy of regulation that continues to impede effective antitrust
enforcement is the many layers of competitive review to which bank
mergers are now subject. Every bank merger or bank holding company
acquisition involving a federally insured bank must receive prior approval
from either the Comptroller of the Currency, the FDIC, or the Federal
Reserve Board. Both the Bank Merger Act of 1966102 and the Bank Holding
Company Act of 19563 incorporate the substantive standards of the anti-
trust laws, including section 7 of the Clayton Act. M
Despite the fact that the banking agencies are supposed to apply a
uniform standard, however, their approaches frequently are inconsistent.
Confusion is evident from the regulators' use of the statutorily required
"competitive factors" reports on mergers that they receive from the other
regulatory agencies and the Department of Justice. As a recent General
Accounting Office report concluded, the agencies frequently disagree with
the recommendation submitted by their coordinate agencies and by the
Department, often without articulating any basis for reaching a markedly
different conclusion.
6 5
This statutory scheme is costly in several ways. The lack of uniformity
among the agencies creates uncertainty in the industry and encourages
regulatory forum shopping by merging institutions seeking a more
favorable reception. The redundant competitive reviews add unnecessary
regulatory costs and delay to otherwise efficient transactions. For exam-
ple, even when neither a regulator nor the Department has identified a
competitive problem, present law mandates a thirty-day waiting period
after approval before a transaction may be consummated. Moreover, the
Bank Merger Act immunizes mergers from antitrust scrutiny, except under
section 2 of the Sherman Act, 6 6 after expiration of the waiting period.' 7
This generally necessitates frenzied activity by both the parties to the
merger and the Department of Justice during the 30-day stay, when a
more reasoned approach would permit comprehensive competitive review
without the necessity or threat of expedited litigation. Finally, the web
of the Bank Merger Act and the Bank Holding Company Act catches trans-
actions which present no possible competitive problems. So-called "phan-
tom" mergers, formations and acquisitions of de novo banks, and corporate
112 12 U.S.C. S 1828(c) (1976).
16 12 U.S.C. 5 1841-1850 (1976).
16 15 U.S.C. 5 18 (1976). See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(Bank Merger Act); id. § 1842(c)(Bank
Holding Company Act).
" Comptroller General, Bank Merger Process Should Be Modernized and Simplified 20-27
(August 16, 1982).
11 15 U.S.C. S 2 (1976).
16 Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. S 1828(c)(7)(C). Thrift mergers and bank holding
company acquisitions of failing thrifts do not enjoy such immunity. Instead, such mergers
and acquisitions can be challenged at any time under §7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 5
(1976), in the same manner as any other merger.
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reorganizations are thus subjected to unjustifiable regulatory delay and
sometimes significant filing costs.'68
With the increasing pace of mergers among depository institutions,'69
the transaction and regulatory costs associated with duplicate competitive
review no longer can be justified. The time has come to consider removing
the banking regulators altogether from review of the competitive aspects
of depository institution mergers and acquisitions. As in other sectors
of the economy, the Clayton Act, coupled with the premerger notification
provision of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act," ° should
be deemed sufficient for effective antitrust analysis. The counterproduc-
tive aspects of the present scheme"' should be replaced with a uniform,
rational approach to which all financial institutions would be subject.
This proposal, recently advanced by Assistant Attorney General
Baxter," would have two important effects. First, it would expedite
mergers and acquisitions that involve no competitive problem, which in-
cludes the vast majority of all commercial bank mergers."3 Second, the
proposal would aid consistency in antitrust enforcement by leaving to the
Department of Justice, the executive branch agency responsible for en-
forcing the antitrust laws, sole authority to enforce the Clayton Act in
bank merger cases on behalf of the federal government. By rationalizing
and unifying competitive analysis, and at the same time allowing review
of financial soundness and other non-competitive factors to remain with
the banking regulators, the proposal would improve antitrust enforcement
without jeopardizing other Congressional policy goals. Whether viewed
from the perspective of the antitrust lawyer or the banking lawyer, these
are persuasive reasons for change.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Garn-St Germain Act is a landmark piece of legislation. Although
not comprehensive and not perfect, the Act dramatically continues the
' See Baxter Testimony, supra note 139, at 14-17.
1 2 The Antitrust Division is responsible for evaluating mergers and acquisitions under
the Bank Merger Act and the Bank Holding Company Act. In 1982, the Division received
and reviewed over 1800 depository institution merger applications.
1" 15 U.S.C. S 18a (1976); 16 C.F.R. 5 803.20 (1983).
171 For example, under the Bank Merger Act the banking regulator that approves a
bank merger is permitted to intervene as of right to defend its decision in any case challenging
the acquisition under the antitrust laws. 12 U.S.C. S 1828(c)(7)(D). Since the statute requires
the court to determine the issue de novo, the practical result of this intervention is to
allow the defendant bank to argue that the "government" is supporting its position in the
case, although the plaintiff may be the United States Department of Justice. See id. S
1828{c)(7)(A). Thus, the "government" is busy litigating against itself, surely a most ineffi-
cient method of antitrust enforcement.
1 Baxter Testimony, supra note 139, at 1849.
1 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, S 7A of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. S 18a, allows early termination of the waiting period for those acquisitions present-
ing no competitive problems.
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process of regulatory reform of the financial services industry begun in
1980. Given the technological and economic transformation now occurring
in the industry, however, more changes are on the way. Having nearly
conquered the immediate crisis in the thrift industry, Congress now should
turn its attention to the more basic deregulation issues that were placed
on the back burner a year and a half ago.
